ABSTRACT In a real network environment, multiple types of attacks can occur. The more important the service or network, the more attacks it may suffer simultaneously. Moving target defense (MTD) technology is a revolutionary game-changing cyberspace technology that has found various applications in recent years. However, the existing strategies are targeted at defending against specific types of attacks and do not meet the security requirements for multiple attacks. Therefore, we propose a joint defense strategy based on the MTD that can select one or multiple mutant elements to defend against different types of attacks. In addition, we use the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to quantify the factors affecting the attack and defense costs. After comprehensively analyzing the effects of the different MTD technologies against different attacks, we propose an efficient strategy selection algorithm based on joint defense. Finally, we conduct experiments to evaluate the selection of a joint defense strategy under multiple attacks. The experimental results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed joint defense strategy selection approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, capitalizing on the development of advanced computer technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and blockchain, web applications have become more diversified, augmented, and intelligent. However, the popularity of web technologies has also made them common targets for cyber criminals. To defend against cyber threats, defenders have adopted network security defense technologies such as network firewalls, intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), and intrusion detection systems (IDSs). Unfortunately, these defense technologies are aimed at defending against network attacks in a static environment. In theory, attackers have unlimited time to study these static configurations and their potential weaknesses. Therefore, the attackers can not only effectively plan and launch attacks but also easily evade detection. In contrast, the defenders are limited to passive defense.
To reduce the asymmetry between attackers and defenders, moving target defense (MTD) [1] technology was developed.
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MTD is a class of computer network defenses that continuously change the attack surface of the network system [2] - [5] , increasing the cost and difficulty of an attack by reducing the determinism, similarity and staticity of the network system. Several MTD techniques exist, including (i) network-based MTD, (ii) application-based MTD and (iii) instruction-based MTD. The network-based MTD technique rearranges the network setting into various layers (e.g., IP address, topology, proxy, protocol) [6] - [13] . The application-based MTD technique uses multiple system components to provide the same services (e.g., operating systems, software variants, or databases) [14] - [16] . The instructionbased MTD technique provides equivalent functions with different instruction sets (e.g., programming languages, address spaces) [17] - [20] . Furthermore, these technologies complement only the original defenses; they do not replace them.
Although previous studies have proposed numerous MTD techniques for different network security threats, they are suitable for only specific types of attacks. As illustrated in Figure 1 , attackers can launch different attacks on the server. When attacker 1 launches an SQL injection attack, the defender can change the database type to stop the attack. When attacker 2 launches a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, the defender can minimize the effects by changing the communication proxy and the IP address. When attacker 3 launches a worm attack, the defender can choose to mutate the IP address and operating system elements. However, these are single-attack MTD defenses. Therefore, when attacker 1 and attacker 3 launch SQL injection and worm attacks simultaneously, the defender changes only the database, the operating system or IP address; the defender can defend against only one of the attacks. For example, if the defender chooses to change only the IP address, it will only be able to defend against worm attacks and not against SQL injection attacks. If the defender changes only the database, then the system will have the possibility of being attacked by worms. Thus, when the system is faced with multiple attacks, it is impossible for the defender to defend against all attacks by changing only one mutation element. Therefore, to increase the defense scope and efficiency, a new strategy is needed to simultaneously defend against multiple attacks. For example, when the system suffers from both SQL injection and worm attacks, the defender should change multiple mutation elements, such as the IP address and database or the operating system and database. In this manner, the defender can effectively defense both types of attackers simultaneously, which greatly increases the security of the system when compared with transforming a single mutant element. Unfortunately, no research concerning this aspect exists. When a system is subjected to multiple attacks, the simplest path is to apply all MTD techniques simultaneously. However, applying MTD technology may reduce service availability and increase network and service loads, and the system resources are limited. Therefore, executing all MTD technologies simultaneously is unrealistic. This scenario inspired us to focus on how to select an efficient defense strategy based on limited network resources under multiple attacks. The main contributions of this study are as follows:
• The attack cost and defense cost are quantitatively analyzed by the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). The defense effects of different MTD technologies on different attack types are summarized and analyzed. The results serve as the basis for defensive strategy selection.
• This paper develops a joint defense strategy to address multiple attacks. We propose an efficient defense strategy selection algorithm based on joint defense.
To improve the accuracy of this algorithm, the joint defense payoff function considers both defensive costs and benefits.
• We conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate the efficient defense strategy selection against multiple attacks. The experimental results show that when faced with multiple attacks, the proposed approach can choose the best combination of defense strategies that maximizes the defense effect while minimizing the defense cost.
II. RELATED WORK
This section describes common network attacks and corresponding MTD defense methods, as well as efficient policy selection methods.
A. MTD TECHNOLOGY
As networks have undergone rapid development, several trends have emerged in attacks launched against network applications and services, one of which is DDoS attacks. DDoS detection and mitigation have been extensively studied via various approaches, such as detecting suspicious flows in a software defined network (SDN) [21] and redirecting the traffic to middle mboxes in the cloud [50] . In addition, a number of MTD-based approaches [10] , [22] , [23] against DDoS have been proposed. Jia et al. [22] reassigned clients to new replica servers when a DDoS attack occurred. Venkatesan et al. [23] periodically redirected clients to a random active proxy server, which disrupted the attacker's reconnaissance efforts and mitigated ongoing attacks. A number of approaches have been devoted to the detection and prevention of SQL injection attacks [24] - [26] , such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, and taint tracking. In addition, Appelt et al. [27] proposed a black-box automated testing approach that targeted SQL injection attacks. Taguinod et al. [15] applied MTD concepts to web applications but provided only a theoretical explanation. Keromytis and Prevelakis [19] defended against SQL injection attacks by modifying the Perl interpreter to permit randomized script execution. For reconnaissance attacks, researchers have distorted reconnaissance and scan attacks by randomly changing network attributes [6] , [11] , [12] , [28] . Jafarian et al. [6] defended against reconnaissance by randomizing IP addresses, MAC addresses, and domain names. Chavez et al. [11] developed defense technologies that automatically reconfigure IP addresses, ports, and network paths. Kampanakis et al. [12] implemented MTD techniques in the SDN framework. Luo et al. [28] hid network servers and applications by constantly changing their IP addresses and ports based on source identity. To defend against worms, Chen and Ranka [30] detected concerted scanning activities and derived possible signatures of worm attacks to provide early-stage worm propagation warnings. Furthermore, several studies have confused targeted attacks by dynamically changing network addresses [6] , [29] . To defend against web bots, Vikram et al. [31] prevented them from automating web VOLUME 7, 2019 resource access by randomizing HTML elements. To defend against side-channel attacks, Azab and Eltoweissy [32] migrated cloud tenants' applications between different hosts. To defend against jamming attacks, Marttinen et al. [33] adopted an approach in which the source MAC address depends on the frame destination and only the receiver knows how to encode the source address. Regarding buffer overflow attacks, Boyd et al. [20] prevented code-injection attacks by randomizing the underlying system's instructions, causing the foreign code to fail to execute correctly. Van Gundy and Chen [34] thwarted cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by randomizing the XML namespace prefixes of tags in documents before delivering them to clients. Thus far, while much research has been concentrated on MTD approaches, these studies have targeted only a small number of specific attacks and cannot be extended to defend against other attacks. When faced with multiple attacks at the same time, the methods proposed in existing articles can defend only one or a small number of attacks and are ineffective against other types of attacks, which increases the risk of a successful attack on the system. Therefore, selecting reasonable mutant elements to resist multiple attacks has become an urgent problem. However, there are few studies on this, and thus the purpose of our article is to select effective MTD defense strategies against multiple attacks with limited defense resources.
B. EFFICIENT POLICY SELECTION
When a network is subjected to multiple simultaneous attacks, simply applying a combination of different MTD techniques will increase the performance overhead of the network systems substantially. Hence, it is necessary to select an efficient defense strategy under certain restrictions. Recently, research on efficient defense strategy selection has attracted considerable attention. Lei et al. [35] constructed an MTD confrontation model based on a multistate Markov game and selected an optimal strategy using a nonlinear programming method. In addition, the authors considered both defensive costs and benefits through a criterion function and a revenue function. Hao et al. [36] approached network attack-defense as an evolutionary game model with incomplete information and constructed stochastic replicator dynamic equations to make decisions for both the attackers and the defender. Similar to [36] , the authors of [7] , [38] constructed an attackdefense game as a multistage Markov evolutionary game. All of these studies selected the optimal strategies using a Markov decision process. However, in these studies, only one attack occurred at each stage of the Markov process. The defenders chose the defense strategy based on the attack type in each stage; thus, the selected defense strategies are unsuitable against multiple simultaneous attacks.
Therefore, when faced with multiple attacks or threats, how to dynamically change the system properties and increase the security of the system become very important. Okhravi et al. [39] designed the Trusted Dynamic Logical Heterogeneity System (TALENT) to change its hardware platform and operating system. Connell et al. [40] proposed a method to defend against multistep attacks by transforming the service platform and IP address, and they analyzed the effectiveness of the method. Although these searches integrated several MTD technologies, they did not consider the defense strategy when faced with multiple attacks. Crouse and Fulp [41] , [42] employed the genetic algorithm to find temporally and spatially diverse secure computer configurations. Smith [43] employed the genetic algorithm to evolve more secure computer configurations; the authors then supervised the evolutionary strategy by artificial intelligence strategies with support vector machines and classification and regression trees. John et al. [44] applied the genetic algorithm to find new configurations. These new configurations were created based on the security of the previous configurations and could be periodically implemented to change the system's attack surface. Although these articles were all based on the use of the genetic algorithm to choose different system configurations, they considered only attacks against the host and did not consider the configuration required for attacks against the network. In addition, they did not consider the cost of changing these configurations and the relationship between these configurations and attacks. Due to the limited availability of system resources, a new approach is needed to find an effective defense strategy.
As the basis of the selection of a defense strategy, the analysis and quantification of the cost and benefit of attack and defense are of great significance to strategy selection. However, there are few studies on quantified attack and defense costs. Jiang and Fang [45] analyzed the payoff and cost of attack and defense, respectively, but the authors did not analyze the factors that affect these returns and costs in detail. Connell et al. [46] proposed a quantitative analytic model for assessing the availability and performance of resources that are reconfigured by an MTD, but the focus of their research was to determine the optimal reconfiguration rate that maximizes a utility function. Sun and Wei [47] defined the time for the defender to repair the damaged assets as the defender's loss. Yang and Wei [37] defined the defense cost as proportional to the number of connections, whereas the attack cost was understood as the average time cost paid by an attacker to storm the nodes in the network. Van Leeuwen et al. [48] analyzed the operational costs of MTD from the aspects of operating expenses, the use rate of the network or endpoint node resource, and the change in overhead with changes in network size. Podobnik et al. [49] quantified the cost of an attack by connecting the feedback mechanisms and resilience dynamics between two competing dynamic networks with differing levels of resilience. Although these methods quantify the cost of attack and defense from different aspects, they do not analyze the specific indicators that affect the cost and the relationship between these indicators.
In active defense, defenders often must evaluate the security situation of the network in order to choose the appropriate defense strategy. Hao et al. [51] predicted the threat scenario with full information including the attacker's threat capacity, threat goal, threat path, threat success probability and threat completion time. They then converted the potential threats to a certain level of risk to measure the overall security. Hu et al. [52] employed an absorbing Markov chain (AMC) to estimate the network security in combination with the big data correlation analysis technique. Wu et al. [53] proposed a security situational awareness mechanism based on the analysis of big data in the smart grid. Lakhdhar et al. [54] proposed a formal model for the supervision of cyber system security, the proactive assessment of attack damage, and the execution of security countermeasures at the appropriate time to maintain critical resources.
III. DEFENSE MODEL
This section introduces the overall defense model under multiple attacks. This model mainly includes attack cost analysis, defense cost analysis, joint defense strategy and efficient strategy selection. The defense model is shown in Figure 2 .
First, the cost of the attack is evaluated by five indicators: Time, Expertise, Detection, Software and Hardware. These indicators are quantitatively analyzed by AHP. Then, the cost of executing each attack is determined.
Second, the transformation cost for each mutant element is measured by four indicators: Network Resources, Complexity, Expenses and Host Resources. Similar to quantifying the attack cost, the defensive cost indicators are quantified using AHP. Then, the costs of transforming different elements are determined.
After analyzing the different attacks and mutant elements, this paper analyzes the defensive effects of mutating different elements against different attacks. Based on the results, a joint defense strategy in a multiattack environment is proposed. Finally, an efficient strategy selection algorithm is proposed in this paper that enables defenders to select the efficient defense strategy under different system resource restrictions. Each part of the model is described in detail below.
IV. THREAT COST
Due to the existence of different targets and means, the damage from various types of attacks also differs. Damage is divided into three levels: high, medium and low (Table 1) . A high-damage attack can interrupt service or remotely gain system privileges, leading to leakage of confidential information. A medium-damage attack allows the attacker to steal user identities or leaks of general information. A low-damage attack allows the attacker to obtain basic information about the attack target.
Due to the complexity of network attacks, a network attack cost evaluation cannot be expressed by a single indicator; instead, a group of indicators is required. The available indicators include the attack duration, the attack expertise, the degree of difficulty that can be detected, and the software and hardware used by the attacker.
The attack duration represents the time required from the beginning of the attack to its completion. The longer the duration, the more energy the attacker expends, and the greater the time cost. In contrast, a shorter attack involves less energy expenditure by the attacker, which reduces the cost. For example, redirection attack can be accomplished in a short period of time; such an attack requires a link containing malicious content to be sent to the victim and lure the victim to click on the link. In contrast, a DDoS attack requires a long time to send a large amount of data to the victim in order to interrupt the service. The time cost of a DDoS attack is greater than that of a redirect attack. According to statistics and expert knowledge, when the attacker needs a long time to attack, the attacker's time cost is high. When the attacker needs an intermediate amount of time to attack, the duration cost is medium. When the attack needs only a short time to succeed, the attacker's duration cost is low.
The attack expertise indicates the attacker's proficiency in the principles and methods of the attack. For example, if an attacker wants to implement an SQL injection attack, the attacker must be familiar with the differences between different databases. To improve the attack efficiency, the attacker has to be familiar with the differences between different databases. Although there are some auxiliary tools that can find SQL injection points and automatically launch attacks, in most cases manual injection is needed to bypass filtering mechanisms. Of course, some attacks can be completed only by means of auxiliary tools, such as Scan and Reconnaissance. When an attacker needs comprehensive expertise to attack successfully, the cost is high. When an attacker needs an intermediate level of expertise to attack, the cost is medium. When the attacker can attack with little or no expertise, the cost is low. The degree of difficulty that can be detected indicates the probability of a launched attack being detected by the victim or security device (IDS, firewall). Industrial firewalls generally consist of three technologies: packet filtering, state packet inspection and application network management [55] . When the attack is detected by all technologies, the probability of being detected is high. When the attack is detected by two technologies, the probability of being detected is medium. When the attack is detected by only one technology, the probability of being detected is low. The probability of detection of an attack is linked to the mode and principle of the attack. For example, the goal of a DDoS attack based on UDP flooding is to consume the victim's bandwidth. Such attacks are easily detected by these three detection techniques. Other attacks, such as SQL injection attacks, can only detect malicious statements through packet filtering.
The software cost represents the price that the attacker needs to pay for the attack auxiliary tools. These tools can increase the attack efficiency and success rate, such as Sn1per, John the Ripper and Metasploit Penetration Testing Software. However, not all attacks require software; for example, redirect attacks require the attacker to construct malicious web pages and links. When the price of the attack tool is very low or free, the attacker's software cost is low. When an attacker may need tools to carry out an attack, the software cost is medium. When the attacker needs to spend a lot of money to configure a tool, its software cost is high.
The hardware cost indicates the hardware devices that an attacker might use during an attack. Common network attacks are implemented by simply using a computer, but jamming attacks and side channel attacks require professional equipment for channel monitoring when launching the attacks. In addition, Ixia PerfectStorm can also be used to implement DDoS attacks. When the attacker can perform an attack without specific hardware, the cost is low. When the attacker may need a special hardware device to attack, the cost of the attack is medium. When the attacker must rely on a hardware device to attack, the cost is high. Table 2 evaluates different attacks from the above five aspects. Each indicator is divided into three levels: high(H), medium(M), and low(L).
V. JOINT DEFENSE A. MUTANT ELEMENT COST
As mentioned in the previous section, attackers need to assess the attack costs for launching attacks, and defenders need to assess the costs for deploying defensive measures. Due to resource limitations, defenders can choose only the most appropriate MTD technologies that are within their capabilities and resources. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a quantitative analysis of defense costs. In this paper, defense costs are evaluated based on network resources, host resources, expenses and complexity.
Network resources: When network elements such as IP and topology are selected, network latency increases, and service quality decreases. However, not all mutant elements affect the network greatly. Thus, the impact of different mutant elements on the network can be divided into three levels: high, medium and low. A high level indicates that the element will cause significant network delays or even interrupt the service. A medium level indicates that the element will cause many network delays, and a low level indicates that any network delay will be negligible and will not adversely affect client services. For example, when the network delay exceeds 1 minute, the element has a high impact on the network. When the network delay is greater than 10 seconds and less than 1 minute, the impact of the mutated element on the network is medium. When the network delay is less than 10 seconds, the impact of this element on the network is low.
1) COMPLEXITY
The complexity refers to the workload imposed on defenders by applying MTD. The core idea of MTD is to constantly mutate elements to reduce the predictability and staticity of the system while maintaining sustainable service. This strategy requires different mutant elements to have the same function. For example, if the defender chooses programming languages as mutation elements, the same functionality must be implemented in these programming languages separately to maintain service availability. The complexity of mutating different elements is divided into high, medium and low levels. High complexity means that the defender must perform a lot of work to ensure that the service is available. Medium complexity means that the defender must perform a certain amount of work to prepare and implement the mutation. Low complexity means that the defender can apply mutated elements for defense with a small amount of effort.
2) EXPENSES
Expenses refer mainly to the defenders' purchase costs for software and hardware. The required expenses are also divided into three levels: high, medium and low. High expenditure means that the defender needs to spend a lot of money to buy equipment. Medium expenditure means that the defender needs to spend a certain amount of money to purchase equipment. Low expenditure means that MTD technology can be implemented at a lower cost.
3) HOST RESOURCES
The impact of MTD technology on the host is reflected mainly in the occupation of host resources such as CPU and memory. If the mutation period of MTD is short, the amount of calculation required will be larger, the occupied host resources will be high, and vice versa. The influences of different mutant elements on the host are also divided into three levels: high, medium and low. High indicates that it will consume a lot of host resources. Medium indicates that it will occupy a certain amount of host resources, and low means that only a small number of host resources are needed.
A quantitative analysis of defense costs based on the above descriptions is presented in Table 3 , where H, M and L represent high, medium and low, respectively.
B. JOINT DEFENSE STRATEGY
In the face of various attacks, selecting only one mutant element for change may be effective against only one type of attack and insufficient to defend against others. For example, in Figure 1 , attacker 2 and attacker 3 launch attacks simultaneously. Selecting only the communication proxy as the mutant element provides a defense only against a DDoS attack. To defend against all attacks, the defender must select multiple mutant elements and construct a joint defense based on the attack characteristics and purposes. A joint defense refers to a defense strategy in which the defenders select one or more mutant elements for simultaneous transformation in a multiattack environment.
In the above example, the defender can simultaneously change the communication proxy, IP address and operating system to defend against worm attacks and DDoS attacks. An MTD technique consisting of three mutated elements can be called a joint defense strategy. Note that changing both the communication proxy and IP address can provide better protection against a DDoS attack. However, the defenders may not be able to select both IP addresses and communication proxies as mutant elements due to limited system resources, which raises issues such as what the standard for choosing mutant elements for joint defense should be and which mutant elements are most effective against different attacks. To this end, this section analyzes the defensive effects of different mutant elements against different attacks. The analysis results are reported in Table 4 .
In Table 4 , defense efficiency is divided into three categories, high (H), medium (M) and low (L), and each category is divided into two levels. Level 1 indicates that the selected defense strategy can defend against all attacks of the same type, and level 2 indicates that the selected defense strategy can only defend against a subset of a particular attack type.
For example, the mutant elements with defensive effects against SQL injection attacks include HTML elements, databases, programming language, file information, database information, and instruction sets. Among these, the database, programming language and instruction sets have the best defensive effect because an SQL injection attack requires the attacker to construct an SQL statement to execute the attack, but different databases have different syntaxes and functions. For example, the MySQL database requires single quotes when referencing table and field names, while the Oracle database requires double quotes when referencing table and field names. Thus, a malicious statement constructed by an attacker containing single quotes cannot be executed against an Oracle database. When an attacker sends a malicious statement to the server, the server's background handler will accept and execute this statement. Server background handlers can be implemented in multiple programming languages, such as PHP, Python and ASP, but these programming languages have different results when executing SQL statements. For instance, the Python 'execute' function can execute two separate SQL statements at the same time, but the PHP 'mysql_query' function cannot. In addition, if the defender randomizes SQL keywords such as 'select' and 'from', then the attacker cannot construct an executable SQL statement. Databases, programming language, and instruction sets are key factors in executing database statements; thus, any type of SQL injection attack is likely to fail as they change. Therefore, these factors form the best defense against SQL injection. The attacker's database operation is inseparable from the table and field names it contains. Randomizing such a database information reference effectively increases the attack difficulty. However, SQL injection attacks can target not only the information in the database but also file read and write operations or alterations of system configuration, such as adding system users. Changing database information protects only against a subset of SQL injection attacks, VOLUME 7, 2019 so this approach has less defensive power than database, programming language and instruction set changes. However, its defensive effect is better than mutating file information. When attackers execute SQL injection attacks, they often use auxiliary tools such as SQLmap and Havij. These tools will automatically construct the attack statement and send it to the server. The submitted SQL statements will be loaded after the name of an HTTP element such as 'input'. When the defender dynamically changes the ids and names of these HTML elements, the change prevents SQL injection tools from successful attack attempts to some extent. Similar to file information, although such changes can defend against SQL injection, their defensive effect is less than that of the database, programming language and instruction set. Other mutated elements are not valid for SQL injection attacks.
In reality, no defense can guarantee 100 percent safety, and neither does MTD. MTD only reduces the attackers' advantages by increasing the complexity and diversity of the vulnerable aspects of protected systems; it does not eliminate existing security vulnerabilities.
VI. EFFICIENT STRATEGY SELECTION A. PAYOFF QUANTIFICATION
In the process of network attack and defense, the contest between the attacker and the defender determines the security of the entire network. Thus, defenders should choose the defensive strategy that best reduces attack damage. The defensive payoff can be used to measure the suitability of a defensive strategy. Similarly, the attack payoff can be used to measure attack effectiveness. Therefore, quantifying the defense payoff and attack payoff is the basis of and affects the accuracy of defense strategy selection.
Definition 1 (Attack Cost):
From an attacker's perspective, one or more attacks can be picked from an attack set A = {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , . . . , A n }. As described in Section III, each attack is independent, and the cost of each attack can be considered based on five indicators: time (T), professional (R), detection (D), software (S) and hardware (H). Since the means and purposes of attacks are different, the weights of the five indicators of different attacks also differ.
be the weight set of the cost indicators when the attack is A i . Then, the attack cost of each attack can be defined as follows:
where T i , R i , D i , S i , and H i are the quantized values of the different cost indicators. The weights of these indicators will be determined by the AHP. When m (1 < m ≤ n) attacks are selected simultaneously, the total cost of the attack is
Definition 2 (Defense Cost): When faced with one or more attacks, the defender needs to select one or more elements from the set D = (D 1 , D 2 , D 3 , . . . , D k ) of the mutant elements for defense to achieve the best defense effect.
As observed from the discussion above, the factors affecting the defense cost include the network resources (NRs), complexity (C), fee (F) and host resources (HRs). The weights of these indicators are λ NP , λ C , λ F , and λ HP , respectively, and the defensive cost of choosing D i as the mutation element is
When multiple mutant elements are selected, the total cost of defense is
where 1 < t ≤ k. Definition 3 (Defense Efficiency): Different mutation elements have different defensive effects for different attacks. For example, changing the SQL database has a good defensive effect against an SQL injection attack but is invalid against a DDoS attack. Here η A i , D j indicates the effectiveness of the mutant element D j to attack A i . When the attack is completely blocked, η A i , D j = 1. When the defense is completely invalid, η A i , D j = 0, and in other cases, 0 < η A i , D j < 1. Note that it is unrealistic to completely block an attack; the goal is to improve the defense as much as possible. Even when multiple mutant elements are selected at the same time, the defense efficiency never equals 1. The defense efficiency of multiple mutant elements is defined as follows:
The sigmoid function can map a variable to a value between 0 and 1 and can be expressed as Sigmoid(x) = 1/(1 + e −x ).
Definition 4 (Attack Payoff):
The attack payoff (AP) refers to the benefits an attacker gains after launching a successful attack. It includes two positive payoffs: the damage caused by the attack (AM ) to the target (Table 2 ) and the defensive cost (DC) to the defender. In addition, the attack payoff also contains a negative reward, the cost of the attack (AC). Thus, the attack payoff can be expressed as
This formula expresses the benefits that the attacker gains when carrying out attacks A 1 , A 2 
Definition 5 (Defense Payoff):
The defense payoff (DP) reflects the losses avoided by the defender after taking the a defensive strategy. The defensive payoff also consists of two parts: the positive payoff is the cost to the attacker (AC), and the negative payoff is the cost to the defender (DC) and the damage to the system caused by the attack (AM ). The defender's payoff can be expressed as follows:
where A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m represents the attack types and  D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D t represents the defense measures taken by the defender.
B. EFFICIENT DEFENSE STRATEGY SELECTION ALGORITHM
To solve the efficient defense strategy problem in multiple attacks, this paper proposes an efficient defense strategy selection algorithm based on joint defense. This algorithm is based on a genetic algorithm. In this algorithm, each set of defense strategies is considered to be a chromosome, and each gene on the chromosome corresponds to a different mutation element. When a gene on the chromosome has a value of 1, the mutation element corresponding to the gene is selected in the defense strategy, and when the gene is 0, the mutation element is not included in the defense strategy. Each chromosome is called an individual. In each generation, individuals are selected based on their fitness values. The fitness value represents the relative payoff to the defender, and the formula for calculating individual fitness is
Fittest(G(t))
where G(t) represents an individual in the population, DP represents the payoff to the defender, OR represents the resources occupied by the defense strategy corresponding to G(t), and LR represents the maximum value of resources that can be utilized. The second part of the formula is the penalty function of fitness, where alpha denotes the penalty factor (alhpa > 0). It can be observed from this formula that the defender should select the individual with the highest defensive payoff within the available resources, and when the individual occupies more resources than the available resources, the defender's payoff will decrease. In addition, to increase the accuracy of the defense, three restrictions should be added during the process of selecting the efficient individual.
Constraint 1(Priority): Defenders may face more than one type of attack, and different attacks represent different hazards to the system. Due to resource limitations, it is necessary to prioritize the defenses against high-risk attacks. For example, for a system suffering from a scan attack and an SQL injection attack, the priority should be to defend against the SQL injection attack. If the individual satisfies the priority, then Priority() equals 1; otherwise, it equals 0.
Constraint 2(Conflict):
Conflicts can occur between different mutated elements. For example, a Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) cannot be installed in the Linux system environment, and an executable file cannot be opened in a Linux system. Therefore, that web server and operating system cannot be selected simultaneously in the defense strategy. In addition, file information and operating systems cannot be selected simultaneously in the defense strategy. If the individual satisfies this constraint, then Conflict() equals 1; otherwise, it equals 0. Constraint 3(Limit): Defenders must choose defense strategies in a limited resource environment. These limited resources include network resources, system resources and money.
The selection algorithm to obtain the efficient defense strategy is presented in Algorithm 1. 
G(t) ← Selection(G(t))

10:
G(t) ← Crossover(G(t)
11:
G(t) ← Mutation(G(t)
12:
if Priority(G(t)) == 0 then 13: continue; 14: if Conflict(G(t)) == 0 then 15: continue; 16: t ← t + 1;
17:
G(t) ← G(t − 1))
18:
if Occupied_Resources > Limited_Resources then 19: Penalize(G(t)); 
Evaluate_fittest(G(t));
22: return G(t)
Keep_best() preserves individuals with the highest fitness in each generation. Selection(), Crossover() and Mutation() represent individual selection, crossover and mutation operations in the genetic process, respectively. Penalize() represents the penalty function, and Evaluate_fittest() calculates the fitness value of the individual by using (8) .
A genetic algorithm is a metaheuristic inspired by the process of natural selection. In a genetic algorithm, a population of candidate individuals in an optimization problem is evolved toward better solutions. The genetic algorithm has good global search ability. The search starts from the group and has potential parallelism. In addition, multiple individuals can be compared simultaneously during the search process. However, due to the small differences between individuals at the end of evolution, it is easy to converge to the local optimal solution. This is a flaw of the genetic algorithm. The purpose of this paper is not to improve the shortcomings of genetic algorithms but to select effective defense strategies within certain conditions through genetic algorithms. Therefore, we choose a certain number of evolutions as the termination condition of the genetic algorithm. Due to the randomness of crossover and mutation, the final selected defense strategy may not be the optimal solution, but it is still very effective.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Existing research has made great strides in defense strategy selection [35] - [38] , but these advances have all focused on defense strategy selection for a single attack. In contrast to the existing research, this paper focuses on defensive strategy selection under multiple attacks.
A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
In this paper, the experiments are simulated and computed in MATLAB. The experimental environment is MATLAB R2017b, a server running a Windows 10 OS, an Intel Xeon E5-2620 CPU and 32 GB of memory.
B. INITIALIZING PARAMETERS
First, the attack damage in Table 1 is initialized. Highdamage, medium-damage and low-damage attacks are represented by 200, 100, and 50, respectively. The high, medium, and low attack costs in Table 2 are also represented by 200, 100, and 50. To accurately describe the attack cost, AHP is used to calculate the weight of each indicator that affects the cost of the attack. The results of different attacks are reported in Table 5 .
In Table 5 , the weights of the attack cost indicators are calculated by AHP. Thus, the attack costs of different attacks can be calculated according to (1) . Similar to the attack cost indicators, the cost indicators of defense are reported in Table 6 . Furthermore, the defense cost level from Table 3 is assigned; H is assigned a value of 50, M is assigned a value of 30, and L is assigned a value of 10.
As mentioned in Section V, the same mutated elements have different defensive efficiencies for different attacks: the higher the defensive efficiency, the higher the payoff to the defender. However, a complete defense against an attack is impossible; thus, the value of defense efficiency cannot be equal to 1. Based on expert knowledge and analysis of attacks, the specific values of defense efficiency are reported in Table 7 .
C. EVALUATION
The experiments are to verify the rationality of the defense strategy analysis and the effectiveness of the proposed efficient defense strategy selection algorithm under multiple attacks. In our experiments, the individual size is fixed to 19, which is the same as the number of mutated elements. The population size is set to 10, and the maximum generation is set to 100. The populations in the first generation are randomly generated. Each experiment uses the tournament selection method to select individuals for the next generation. The crossover and mutation probabilities are 0.8 and 0.01, respectively. The termination condition is set to 100 generations.
1) MULTIPLE ATTACKS WITHOUT CONSTRAINTS
In this experiment, only Constraint 3 is considered in the individual generation and selection process. That is, the defense cost of Constraint 3 is selected as the criterion for selecting the defense strategy, the individuals do not need to be valid for all attacks, and conflicts between different mutant elements are ignored. We set the penalty factor to 2, i.e., alpha = 2. The average defense cost of all individuals in each generation is calculated, and this average defense cost is regarded as the maximum system resource that can be utilized. The average defense cost is represented by ALR; then, AOR can be expressed as shown below:
where N represents the number of individuals in each generation, AOR represents the defense cost of each individual in each generation, and D t represents the mutant element selected in the individual. The number of evolution iterations is 100. We can replace LR and OR in (8) with ALR and AOR, respectively; therefore, the fitness can be expressed as 
follows:
Fittest(G(t)) = DP AOR<ALR DP−alpha * (AOR−ALR) AOR>ALR (11) According to Algorithm 1, an efficient defense strategy can be selected from each evolved generation. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the defense payoff and the cost of each generation's efficient defense strategy without constraints 1 and 2, respectively. As Figure 3 shows, as the defensive strategy evolves, the payoff to defenders increases. In contrast, the cost in Figure 4 decreases constantly. According to (11) , the fitness value of each individual is determined jointly by the defense payoff and cost. The goal of the defensive strategy selection algorithm is to find the defensive strategy with the highest payoff under limited resource conditions. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand that the defense cost is inversely proportional to the defensive payoff. In addition, the jaggedness of the curves in the graph is due to randomness in the evolution process. Although the defense payoff has some fluctuations, its overall trend is to grow and converge. Table 8 reports details of the defense strategies at different stages of the evolution process; the large black dots indicate that the associated mutated element is included in the defensive strategy. The right side of the table reports the defensive payoffs and costs corresponding to the different stages. The upper axis represents the value of the defense payoff, and the lower axis represents the value of the defense cost. From the results, we can conclude that at the beginning of the evolutionary process, the defense strategy contains more mutant elements, but those mutant elements have a relatively low defensive effect, leading to high defense costs but poor defensive effects. However, it can be observed that the defensive strategy gradually chooses elements with better defensive effects and lower costs.
As mentioned above, the final defense strategy may not be the optimal one because the genetic algorithm is prone to fall into local optima. Table 9 reports the difference between the ultimate defense strategy and the defense strategy with the highest defensive payoff. In this experiment, the 97th and 99th evolutions all achieved the highest defensive payoff, the payoff value was 234.7894, and the defense cost was 48.128. The defense payoff from the last evolution was 233.86, and the defense cost was 39.38. Although the payoff of the ultimate defense strategy was not the highest, the gap between it and the highest value was very small, and the defense cost was far less than the defense cost when the defense payoff was the highest. This finding satisfies the strategy selection requirements in a limited resource environment, so the final defense strategy is effective.
2) MULTIPLE ATTACKS WITH CONSTRAINTS
In contrast to the first experiment, Constraints 1 and 2 are added to the individual generation and selection process in this experiment. To illustrate the importance of Constraint 1 and Constraint 2 in strategy selection, this experiment uses the same attack types and parameters as the previous experiment. The experimental results are as follows. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the defenders' payoffs and costs under Constraints 1 and 2, respectively. Table 10 shows the details of the defense strategies at different stages. In brief, the defensive payoff follows an upward trend, while the defensive cost exhibits a downward trend. Compared to the previous experiment, the defensive payoff rises faster. In this experiment, the average payoff to the defender was 228, and the average cost was 48, whereas in the previous experiment, the average payoff was 214, and the cost was 60. By comparing the defensive strategies of these two experiments, it can be observed that the defense strategy becomes more biased towards the mutated elements with good defensive effect under Constraints 1 and 2, which improves the defense efficiency and payoff.
This phenomenon occurs because each defensive strategy must be effective for all high-damage attacks after following the constraints. This approach narrows the range of defense strategy selection and accelerates the speed of selecting the efficient defense strategy. In addition, due to the lack of interference from invalid defense elements, the defense costs also decrease. In this experiment, the ultimate defense strategy has the highest defense payoff.
3) JOINT DEFENSE VERSUS SINGLE-ELEMENT DEFENSE
To illustrate the importance of a joint defense, the defensive strategy selected by the method proposed in this paper is compared with applying a single mutation element. Singleelement defense refers to the selection of a single mutated element that has the best effect against multiple attacks. The comparison results are as follows. Figure 7 shows the payoff comparison between joint defense and single-element defense when the defense cost is the comprehensive cost. A defender who chooses the joint defense receives a higher payoff than a defender who chooses the single-element defense. The payoff of the joint defense strategy generally exhibits an upward trend because the defense strategy selection algorithm gradually selects the mutant elements with good defense effects, as reported in Table 11 . Although the defensive payoff improves, it can be seen from Figure 8 that the joint defense cost also increases. This increase occurs because the cost of transforming multiple mutated elements is higher than the cost of transforming single mutant elements.
As shown in Table 11 , when an attacker chooses the Reconnaissance, Scan and Rootkit attacks, the joint defense VOLUME 7, 2019 strategy includes primarily the operating system, programming language and instruction set. Transforming the operating system effectively defends against the Reconnaissance and Rootkit attacks, whereas transforming the programming language and instruction set effectively defends against SQL injection attacks. In contrast, the single-element defense strategy selects only the database. Transforming the database can defend only against SQL injection attacks. On the right side of the comparison results is a schematic diagram of the payoff and cost of the joint defense at different stages, and below the figure is the payoff and cost of the single-element defense. The data in this diagram show that the joint defense strategy has an average defense payoff of 193 and an average defense cost of 88. The payoff of the single-element defense is 67, and its defense cost is 34. Compared to the single-element defense, the joint defense strategy increases the payoff to the defender by 1.8-fold while increasing the cost by only 1.5-fold. Although the cost of defense increases, the joint defense can defend against all the attacks. Therefore, it is worthwhile for a defender to choose the joint defense strategy to defend against multiple simultaneous attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The focus of this paper was to study an efficient defense strategy using MTD defense technology in multiattack scenarios. First, the hazards and implementation costs of different types of attacks were analyzed and quantified, and the defense costs of different MTD technologies were also quantified. Then, for the first time, this paper analyzed the defensive effects of different MTD techniques on different attacks. To demonstrate the necessity of adopting a joint defense strategy under multiple attacks, this paper conducted experiments under different system resource constraints. The experimental results demonstrated that despite limited resources, it is still worthwhile to select multiple mutant elements simultaneously to form a suitable joint defense against attack types and damages.
Our future work includes research regarding more metrics that affect the costs of attack and defense and a reasonable method for quantifying these metrics. In addition, we intend to conduct research on the rapid perception and prediction of attacks and choose effective defense strategies based on the prediction results to improve the accuracy and practicability of the defense. Moreover, we intend to apply a real-time joint defense strategy in a large-scale real environment. BIN WU received the Ph.D. degree in signal and information processing from the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, where he is currently a Lecturer with the National Disaster Recovery Technology Engineering Laboratory. His research interests include network security, intrusion detection, apt analysis, and mobile networks security. VOLUME 7, 2019 
